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ABSTRACT
Despite widespread evidence of anti-transgender prejudice and discrimination, research
has yet to determine the nature of prejudice against transgender people. This study used the
sociofunctional threat approach (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005) to examine threat perceptions
(contamination threats, obstacle threats, physical safety threats, and threats to reciprocity
relations) and emotional reactions (disgust, anger, fear, pity) to transgender (transgender women,
transgender men, and nonbinary people) and cisgender (cisgender women, cisgender men, and
bisexual people) targets. Results from an online survey suggest that transgender targets evoke
higher threat perceptions and negative emotions than cisgender targets; additionally, this tended
to be the case for male participants more often than female participants. These results provide
more details on the negative associations that underlie transphobia, providing stepping stones for
focusing future interventions.
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A SOCIOFUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING TRANSPHOBIA
Despite widespread evidence of anti-transgender prejudice and discrimination, research
has yet to determine the nature of prejudice against transgender people (used in this research to
refer to those whose gender differs from their sex assigned at birth). The current study is among
the first empirical research to use a theory-driven approach to map transphobia and resulting
discrimination. Using the sociofunctional threat approach (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005), this
research identifies the emotional reactions and threat perceptions that inform transphobia.
Moreover, this research tests whether transphobia differs across transgender subgroups (i.e.,
transgender men, who were assigned female and identify as male; transgender women, who were
assigned male and identify as female; and nonbinary people, who identify between or beyond the
male/female binary).
Transgender essayists (e.g., Stone, 2006) have long suggested that transgender people disrupt
traditional understandings of gender for cisgender people (i.e., those who identify with their sex
as assigned at birth), and are targeted with discrimination to “defend the status quo of the
existing gender system” (Bornstein, 2006, p. 237). The importance of binary gender in daily life
and social structuring is clear, as everything from restrooms to sports teams, clothing to
toiletries, and occupations to entertainment are demarcated as being for either men or women.
These demarcations are essential not only for individuals navigating the social world, but also for
businesses and corporations to market these gendered products towards targeted audiences,
1
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resulting in both social and economic forces motivating the maintenance of a strict, easily
understandable gender binary. This binary is upheld by what Garfinkel (1957) termed “the
natural attitude about gender,” a naïve view that gender is a self-evident, common-sense
biological reality (cited in Bettcher, 2013). This enables people to clearly demarcate gender on
the basis of biological sex characteristics (particularly genitals; Bettcher, 2013), a process which
transgender people disrupt. To overcome this disruption, transgender people’s own gender
identification is denied in favor of ideas about biological sex.
Indeed, transgender and gender-nonconforming people face ubiquitous discrimination
and structural inequality (Grant, Mottet, Tanis, Harrison, Herman, & Keisling, 2011), leading to
extremely elevated rates of poverty and suicide attempts. This discrimination extends across all
aspects of life. Within education, 78% have been harassed, 35% physically assaulted, and 12%
sexually assaulted in K-12 education, leading 15% to leave a school. Within employment, 90%
have either faced workplace discrimination or remained closeted to avoid it; 47% were fired, not
hired, or denied promotion because of their identity or expression; and 50% were harassed at
work. In housing, 19% were refused a house/apartment, whereas 11% were evicted. In daily life,
53% have been verbally harassed in public spaces, 22% were denied equal treatment by
government agencies or officials, and 19% were denied medical treatment.
As awareness of these issues has increased, there has also been a rise in legislation aimed
at upholding and institutionalizing this discriminatory treatment. In 2015, state legislators
proposed 21 bills aimed at limiting the rights and acceptance of transgender people; in 2016, this
number climbed to 44 (Human Rights Campaign Foundation, 2016). Most of these bills were
aimed at limiting access to restrooms, locker rooms, and other sex-segregated spaces. They also
sought to limit transgender people’s ability to receive healthcare, marry, and correct their legal
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gender markers; as well as overturn nondiscrimination protections and allow refusal of public
services based on religious belief. These discriminatory bills have a much broader reach than
individual acts of discrimination, illustrating the importance of understanding not only what
motivates overt discrimination, but also what drives support for such legislation.
Little is known about the nature of transphobia (i.e., prejudice against transgender and
gender-nonconforming people) and the processes that lead to these discriminatory actions and
legislations. Though transphobia is highly correlated with homophobia, Nagoshi and colleagues
(2008) still found uniquely significant predictors for transphobia (e.g., authoritarianism,
benevolent sexism) when controlling for homophobia, at least for women participants, who
evidenced lower levels of both homophobia and transphobia than men. Tebbe and Moradi (2012)
found a similar relationship between homophobia and transphobia, with homophobia strongly
related to transphobia (r = .58 to .68), but with traditional gender role attitudes and need for
closure maintaining unique relationships to transphobia. Tebbe and Moradi also replicated men’s
higher levels of transphobia than women, but found that the pattern of predictors for transphobia
was similar across gender groups.
Also differentiating transphobia from homophobia is that attitudes towards transgender
people are often more negative than attitudes towards sexual minorities. In a probability sample
of U.S. adults (Norton & Herek, 2013), feeling thermometer ratings revealed that heterosexual
respondents had negative views towards transgender people (M = 32.01 on a 0-100 scale); these
views were significantly more negative than their views towards sexual minority groups (M =
34.93, M = 38.89, M = 40.49, bisexual men, gay men, bisexual women, respectively). Thus,
people typically hold negative attitudes towards transgender people, but it is not clear how those
attitudes relate to behavior or are distinct from attitudes towards other relevant social groups.
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Several current theories of prejudice hold that prejudice is not best understood as a
unidimensional negative evaluation, but rather as a combination of various cognitive appraisals
and emotional reactions. For example, Glick and Fiske (1996) explain sexism as an ambivalent
combination of hostile sexism (negative feeling about and stereotypes of women) and benevolent
sexism (subjectively positive feelings and stereotypes that nevertheless reinforce women’s
subjugation). Furthermore, Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, and Xu’s (2002) stereotype content model posits
that outgroup appraisals vary along two primary dimensions: warmth and competence. This
creates four primary appraisals and behaviors towards groups: high warmth-high competence
(usually the ingroup or dominant group), who are admired and both actively and passively
helped; high warmth-low competence, who are pitied and actively helped but passively harmed;
low warmth-high competence, who are envied and actively harmed but passively helped; and
low warmth-low competence, who are scorned and both actively and passively harmed. One
study found a general belief that “transgender men and women are… mistaken about themselves
and pitied for this perceived confusion and the challenges it entails” (Gazzola & Morrison,
2014). Though this pity would situate trans people in the high warmth-low competence quadrant
of the stereotype content model, high rates of discrimination suggest active harm behavior, and
indeed, Gazzola and Morrison found this model to be a poor fit for their data. Additionally, these
studies found largely similar stereotypes for both trans men and trans women, but rates of
discrimination are higher for trans women (Grant et al., 2011). This suggests that the nuances of
prejudice towards various transgender groups is still poorly understood, and a two-dimensional
understanding of prejudice may be insufficient to parse these differences.
Cottrell and Neuberg’s (2005) sociofunctional threat approach provides an alternative
way to understand multiple dimensions of prejudice. This approach adopts the evolutionary
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perspective that humans, as fundamentally social creatures, are motivated to maximize the
positive aspects of interaction (such as pooled resources and knowledge), while minimizing the
negative outcomes (such as being attacked, cheated, or infected with disease). Thus, people
ought to be attuned to ways that others may help or hinder their group’s success. This results in
unique perceptions of various outgroups as posing different threats to the ingroup, and measures
of prejudice as merely “negative affect” mask these differences across groups.
In this sociofunctional approach, each threat is linked to functionally-relevant primary
and secondary emotional and behavioral response. For example, the group “gay men,” relative to
“European Americans,” evokes elevated threat perceptions for physical health, group values, and
social coordination, and elevated emotions of disgust, anger, and pity (Cottrell & Neuberg,
2005). The sociofunctional approach has not been applied to transgender groups but can be a
generative source of hypotheses regarding transphobia (Table 1 shows four threat-emotionmotivation links that may be particularly useful in understanding transphobia).
Table 1. Hypothesized links among perceived threats, emotions, and behavioral motivations.
Threat Perception
Contamination to ingroup
Health contagion
Group values
Obstacles to ingroup
Personal freedoms, rights
Social coordination
Trust relations
Physical safety of the ingroup
Failed reciprocity (inability)

Primary
Behavioral Motivation
Emotion
Disgust
Minimize contamination
Avoid disease
Protect value system
Anger
Remove obstacle
Protect/recover freedoms
Repair group functioning
Minimize damage
Fear
Protect self and others
Pity
Return reciprocal relations

Research suggests that these perceptions of a group relate to support or opposition for
relevant policies. Specific personal attitudes, such as acceptance of same-sex relationships and
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willingness to be friends with a transgender person, are some of the strongest predictors of
support for policies protecting LGBT civil rights (Woodford, Atteberry, Derr, & Howell, 2013);
and several prejudice variables, including belief in biological gender, predict opposition to
transgender-supportive policies (Tee & Hegarty, 2006). Most relevant to the current research,
Cottrell, Richards, and Nichols (2010) investigated the role of emotions towards various groups
and attitudes towards policies that affect them. This research found that specific emotional
reactions to each group (as defined above in the sociofunctional approach) predicted social
policy attitudes above and beyond measures of general prejudice; moreover, it was the
hypothesized primary emotion for each group (i.e., disgust towards gays/lesbians, and anger
towards Mexican immigrants, Arab Muslims, and African Americans) that most strongly related
to policy attitudes (gay rights, immigration limitation, homeland security, and hurricane relief
policies, respectively). Finally, these emotions mediated or partially mediated the relationships
between relevant threat perceptions and policy attitudes. These results support the existence of
relationships among perceived threats, emotions, and motivations for outgroup treatment.
The sociofunctional approach is of course just one theory that considers the way various
cognition (such as threat perception) influences emotions. In fact, the sociofunctional approach,
with the addition of evolutionary-based hypotheses, follows a common framework for
understanding the role of cognitive appraisals in emotion: cognitions function as independent
variables with emotion proceeding from this evaluation of personal relevance (Lazarus, 1991).
However, Lazarus (1991) points out that the relationship between cognitive appraisals (of which
threat perceptions are one form) and emotion is bidirectional. Cognitions may also take on the
role of dependent variable, with emotions influencing subsequent appraisals of the situation; the
sociofunctional approach does not account for this bidirectionality, but Pereira, Vala, and Costa-
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Lopes (2010) provide evidence that threat perceptions can serve as rationalizations of existing
prejudice, suggesting that these variables are bidirectional. However, as Lazarus contends,
emotions depend upon cognitions to give rise to them, whereas cognitions can exist without
particular emotional charge. I believe this makes the threat-emotion pathway a logical starting
point for this understudied target group.
Additionally, the attributions made as to the cause of outgroup differences also influence
intergroup attitudes. For example, attributions of sexuality as resulting from nature rather than
personal choice were stronger predictors of support for same-sex unions than political or
religious ideology (Whitehead, 2014). Attributions regarding transgender people likely also play
a role in emotional reactions to them, but this aspect of cognitive appraisals is beyond the scope
of the current research.
Below I describe in greater detail my hypotheses regarding how each perceived threat is
linked to emotion for transgender groups. These hypotheses are derived deductively, based on
transgender people’s experiences of discrimination, and inductively, using lay theories about
transgender people and general theories of prejudice (e.g., the sociofunctional approach).
Threat, Emotion, and Behavioral Motivation
Contamination threats arise when an outgroup is perceived to be able to contaminate the
ingroup, either literally through infectious diseases (i.e., health contagion threat) or figuratively
by polluting the ingroup’s values (i.e., group value threat). Both health contagion threat and
group value threat create disgust and the motivation to avoid contamination (Cottrell & Neuburg,
2005). Supporting this prediction, Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, and Cohen (2009) showed disgust
related to approval of purity-upholding behaviors and condemnation of purity-violating
behaviors. I hypothesize that transgender groups are perceived to pose both of these forms of
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contamination threat. Transgender people may pose health contagion threats, due to conflation
with sexual minorities (Gazzola & Morrison, 2014) and the subsequent association with AIDS
(Cottrell and Neuberg, 2005); this leads to physical disgust. Additionally, transgender groups,
particularly transgender women, pose group value threats, as they threaten values associated with
traditional gender roles, and this leads to moral disgust. Both of these forms of disgust lead to
social distancing and avoidance, which transgender people face regularly (e.g., discrimination in
employment, housing, and public accommodations; Grant et al., 2011).
Obstacle threats arise when an outgroup is perceived to pose an obstacle to the ingroup,
such as threats to trust relations, social coordination, or personal freedom. The obstacle threat
creates anger and a motivation to remove the obstacle (Cottrell & Neuburg, 2005). Findings from
Smith and Ellsworth (1985) that anger is associated with perceptions of a high-effort response to
unpleasantness evoked by another person support this prediction. I hypothesize that transgender
groups are perceived to pose all three of these obstacle threat perceptions. They may be
perceived to threaten trust relations as transgender people are often accused of not “really” being
their gender (Reed, 2012). This argument has particularly been seen in using accusations of
deception to excuse violence against trans women (Bettcher, 2013). Additionally, transgender
people, particularly nonbinary people, are likely to pose a social coordination threat, as they
disrupt gender as a coordinating force and deny binary gender. Finally, transgender people may
be seen as posing personal freedom threats, as cisgender people may feel that their understanding
of gender is being impeded upon by trans people’s needs to be respected in their gender
identities. These threat perceptions lead to anger, which may then manifest in the high rates of
assault that transgender people, particularly transgender women, face (e.g., Grant et al., 2011).
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Physical safety threats arise when an outgroup is perceived as likely to physically harm
the self or valued others. Fear of harm motivates self-protection (Cottrell & Neuburg, 2005). I
hypothesize that, due to arguments that transgender women endanger (cisgender) women in
women’s spaces (Benzie, 2004, as cited in Lombardi, 2009), trans women are perceived to pose
physical safety threats. This idea has been articulated by proponents of “bathroom bills”
(legislation aimed at limiting transgender people’s access to restrooms that align with their
gender identity), with claims that people could “use a vague idea of gender identification to go
into private and intimate spaces and do harm” (Kolkhorst, quoted in Steinmetz, 2017). Though
these arguments do not usually extend to other transgender groups, I predict that trans men and
nonbinary people will also pose physical safety threats due to the shared, overarching
categorization as “transgender.” This categorization invokes feelings of fear, which then signals
motivations to escape and protect the vulnerable from the source of fear. Additionally, fear is a
secondary emotional reaction to various other threats that I hypothesize all transgender people to
pose, and therefore will likely be elicited by all transgender groups.
Reciprocity (by inability) threats arise when an outgroup is perceived to be unable to
fulfill reciprocal relations. For example, relative to European Americans, Native Americans are
pitied for their perceived inability to socially and economically reciprocate. This perceived
inability to reciprocate creates pity and the motivation to help and restore reciprocal relations
(Cottrell & Neuburg, 2005). I hypothesize that transgender people pose reciprocity by inability
threats due to, as Gazzola and Morrison (2014) found, the perception that they are confused
about their gender, which then evokes feelings of pity. This may result in a motivation to have
transgender people appropriately fulfill their societal roles as men or women.
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Hypotheses
Accordingly, I expected all transgender subgroups to differ similarly from cisgender
comparisons. However, in line with the sociofunctional model, I also expected certain subgroups
to differ from others as described above. This research tested three hypotheses. Note that within
these hypotheses, I use the term “gender experience” to refer to the experience of having one’s
gender identity affirmed or contradicted by one’s gender assigned at birth. Here, it is a variable
with two levels: cisgender (those who experience their gender as affirmed) and transgender
(those who experience their gender as contradicted).


Hypothesis 1 (perceived threat): transgender groups will be perceived to pose greater
levels of threat (to values, physical health, social coordination and functioning, personal
freedoms, trust relations, reciprocity due to inability, and physical safety, as well as
general threat) than cissgender groups. Within this broad prediction, I have three more
specific hypotheses.
o H1a: Male participants will exhibit greater levels of threat perceptions toward
transgender groups than female participants.
o H1b: Transgender women will be perceived to pose greater physical safety and
values threats than other groups.
o H1c: Nonbinary people will be perceived to pose greater social coordination
threats than other groups.



Hypothesis 2 (emotion): Transgender groups will evoke greater negative emotional
evaluations and greater disgust, anger, fear, and pity than cisgender groups. Within this
broad prediction, I have three more specific hypotheses.
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o H2a: Male participants will exhibit greater levels of negative emotions toward
transgender groups than female participants.
o H2b: Transgender women will evoke greater fear and disgust than other groups.
o H2c: Nonbinary people will evoke greater anger than other groups.


Hypothesis 3 (moderated mediation): Threat perceptions will mediate the relationship
between target gender experience (transgender, cisgender) and emotion. For instance,
target gender experience will predict perceptions of safety threat, which will in turn
predict fear. Target gender identity (man, woman, neither) will moderate the relationship
between target gender experience and threat perceptions, and target gender experience
and emotion (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Predicted pattern of moderated mediation.
Method
Study Design
This study used a 2(target gender experience: cisgender, transgender) x 3(target gender
identity: man, woman, neither) x 2(participant gender: man, woman) between-subjects design.
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Participants were randomly assigned to evaluate a single group, which was defined to ensure
participants had a basic understanding of the social category (see Appendix A). I compared the
perceived threats and affective reactions associated with transgender people to their cisgender
counterparts (i.e., cisgender men and women). As there is no cisgender equivalent for nonbinary
people, “bisexual people” was used as a comparison that is non-gendered (by including bisexual
people in general) and defies binary categorization by standing outside the gay-straight
dichotomy. Thus, both “nonbinary” and “bisexual” fall within the “neither” gender identity for
this study. See Table 2 to review the target groups and their classification along gender
experience and gender identity.
Table 2. Target groups by gender identity and gender experience.
Gender Identity
Gender
Experience
Cisgender

Transgender

Man
Cis man
(assigned
male)
Trans man
(assigned
female)

Woman
Neither
Cis woman
Bisexual
(assigned
(nonspecified
female)
assignment)
Trans woman
Nonbinary
(assigned
(nonspecified
male)
assignment)

Participants
I recruited 544 participants through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) website.
Frequently used by social science researchers, this website offers financial compensation for
people who complete short, online, studies. I excluded people for failing to faithfully complete
the study and if they did not identify with their assigned gender. Participant attention was
assessed with five possible points from three items. I excluded 137 participants (25.18%) who
scored less than four total points on attention check items, leaving 407 participants. Participants
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also responded to two demographic questions: “What is your gender? [man, woman,
nonbinary/genderqueer, another gender]” and “Are you transgender, nonbinary/genderqueer, or
otherwise do not identify with the sex you were assigned at birth? [yes, no, unsure, do not
understand].” I excluded participants who responded “nonbinary/genderqueer” or “another
gender” to the first question or “yes” to the second question (N = 14, 3.44% of remaining
sample), leaving a total of 393 participants.
I used G*Power 3.1 (Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 1996; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, &
Buchner, 2007), a statistical prospective power software package, to estimate the appropriate
sample size. Prior research (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005) has found medium effect sizes for
differences in emotional reactions across groups and medium to large effects for perceived threat
differences. Thus, I used a medium effect size (f = .25) for the prospective power analysis. I set
G*Power to estimate sample size to test for a between-subjects interaction at 95% power to find
my effect with twelve groups (2 levels of target gender experience x 3 levels of target gender
identity x 2 levels of participant gender). G*Power indicated that a total of 251 participants
would provide adequate power to find my hypothesized effects if they indeed exist; thus, I have
sufficient power to detect medium effect sizes in my hypotheses.
Measures
For the dependent measures, participants completed threat perception and affective
reaction measures (based on Cottrell and Neuberg, 2005, and Cottrell, Richards, and Nichols,
2010).
Threat. For threat, participants indicated agreement with statements regarding the
specific threats the group poses on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree). For
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general threat, I averaged the items “In general, I feel that [target group], as a group, pose a
challenge to people like me” and “In general, I feel that [target group] pose problems for people
like me” (r = .88, p < .001). For threat to values, I averaged the items “In general, I feel that
[target group], as a group, possess values that directly oppose the values of people like me” and
“In general, I feel that [target group], as a group, hold values that are morally inferior to the
values of people like me” (r = .78, p < .001). For threat to physical health, I averaged the items
“In general, I feel that [target group], as a group, increase the risk of physical illness for people
like me” and “In general, I feel that [target group], as a group, harm the medical health of people
like me” (r = .72, p < .001). For threat to social coordination and functioning, I averaged the
items “In general, I feel that [target group], as a group, disrupt everyday social functioning for
people like me” and “In general, I feel that [target group], as a group, make it difficult for things
to run smoothly for people like me” (r = .73, p < .001). For threat to personal freedoms, I
averaged the items “In general, I feel that [target group], as a group, limit the personal freedoms
of people like me” and “In general, I feel that [target group], as a group, restrict the personal
rights of people like me” (r = .88, p < .001). For threat to trust relations, I averaged the items “In
general, I feel that [target group], as a group, cannot really be trusted by people like me” and
“People like me cannot trust [target group], as a group” (r = .77, p < .001). For threat to
reciprocity due to inability, I averaged the items “In general, I feel that [target group], as a group,
are unable to contribute to people like me as much as they take” and “In general, I feel that
[target group], as a group, need to take more from people like me than they are able to give
back” (r = .69, p < .001). For threat to physical safety, I averaged the items “In general, I feel
that [target group], as a group, endanger the physical safety of people like me” and “In general, I
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feel that [target group], as a group, are physically dangerous to people like me” (r = .85, p <
.001).
Affect. For affect, participants reported each emotion when thinking about a particular
group and its members on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely). For negativity, I averaged the
items “In general, how negative do you feel towards [target group], as a group?”, “In general,
how much do you dislike [target group], as a group?”, “In general, how much do you like [target
group], as a group?” (reversed), and “In general, how positive do you feel towards [target group],
as a group?” (reversed) (α = .83). For disgust, I averaged the items “In general, how morally
disgusted are you by [target group], as a group?”, “In general, how morally sickened are you by
[target group], as a group?”, “In general, how physically disgusted are you by [target group], as a
group?”, “In general, how grossed out are you by [target group], as a group?”, and “In general,
how physically sickened are you by [target group], as a group?” (α = .95). For anger, I averaged
the items “In general, how mad are you at [target group], as a group?”, “In general, how angry
are you at [target group], as a group?”, “In general, how bitter are you towards [target group], as
a group?”, and “In general, how much do you resent [target group], as a group?” (α = .94). For
pity, I averaged the items “In general, how much do you pity [target group], as a group?” and “In
general, how sorry do you feel for [target group], as a group?” (r = .72, p < .001). For fear, I
averaged the items “In general, how frightened are you of [target group], as a group?”, “In
general, how afraid are you of [target group], as a group?”, “In general, how anxious are you
about [target group], as a group?”, and “In general, how nervous are you about [target group], as
a group?” (α = .93).
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Results
All hypothesized threat-emotion pairs correlated significantly. As predicted, negativity
correlated strongly with general threat perceptions (r = .63, p < .001). Disgust correlated strongly
with values (r = .80, p < .001) and health (r = .60, p < .001). Anger correlated strongly with
coordination (r = .75, p < .001), freedom (r = .73, p < .001), and trust (r = .74, p < .001). Pity
correlated moderately with inability (r = .37, p < .001). Fear correlated strongly with safety (r =
.77, p < .001). See Table 3 for inter-threat correlations and Table 4 for inter-emotion correlations.
Table 3. Correlations among threat perceptions.
General Values Health Coordination Freedom Trust Inability
General
1.00
Values
.76
1.00
Health
.69
.64
1.00
Coordination
.86
.79
.80
1.00
Freedom
.82
.76
.73
.86
1.00
Trust
.81
.76
.70
.85
.80 1.00
Inability
.85
.72
.72
.82
.81
.77
1.00
Safety
.78
.66
.79
.81
.83
.77
.80
All ps < .001
Table 4. Correlations among emotional reactions.
Negativity Disgust Anger
Fear
Negativity
1.00
Disgust
.83
1.00
Anger
.68
.76
1.00
Fear
.63
.74
.87
1.00
Pity
.31
.43
.35
.38
All ps < .001
Hypothesis 1: Values
In Hypothesis 1, I predicted that transgender groups would be perceived to pose greater
levels of threat (to values, physical health, social coordination and functioning, personal
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freedoms, trust relations, reciprocity due to inability, and physical safety, as well as general
threat) than cisgender groups. I tested this hypothesis with one 2(target gender experience) x
3(target gender identity) x 2(participant gender) Analyses of Variance for each threat dependent
variable. A main effect of target gender experience indicates support for this hypothesis.
I found support for Hypothesis 1 with four of the eight threat perceptions: general threat,
values, coordination, and trust threats (see Table 5). For each of these threats, transgender targets
were viewed as posing greater threats than cisgender targets, with effects in the range of small to
medium. I did not find support for Hypothesis 1 for health, freedom, inability, and safety threats.
For each of these threats, participants viewed transgender targets and cisgender targets as posing
similar levels of threat.
Table 5. Main effects of target gender experience on threats.

F
ηp²
General
5.09*
.01
Values
13.68*** .04
Coordination 4.98*
.01
Trust
6.67**
.02
Health
0.38
.001
Freedom
2.53
.010
Inability
1.48
.004
Safety
0.07
.000
Degrees freedom = 1,381
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Mean (SE)
Transgender Cisgender
3.32 (0.17)
2.78 (0.16)
3.77 (0.19)
2.84 (0.17)
3.20 (0.17)
2.69 (0.15)
3.12 (0.16)
2.55 (0.15)
2.65 (0.15)
2.52 (0.14)
2.95 (0.17)
2.59 (0.15)
3.01 (0.16)
2.75 (0.15)
2.47 (0.16)
2.53 (0.14)

Hypothesis 1a. In Hypothesis 1a, I predicted that male participants would exhibit greater
levels of threat perceptions toward transgender groups than female participants. I tested this with
the same ANOVAs as above, with an interaction between participant gender and target gender
experience indicating support for this hypothesis.
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I found support for Hypothesis 1a with five of the eight threat perceptions (see Table 6):
general threat, health, coordination, freedom, and trust threats, with small effects. Male
participants perceived greater levels of these threats from transgender targets than female
participants did, whereas male and female participants’ perceptions of cisgender targets remained
similar.
I did not find support for Hypothesis 1a for values, inability, and safety threats. For these
threats, male and female participants perceived similar levels of threat for both transgender and
cisgender targets. For safety threat, a significant interaction did emerge, but this was due to
female participants perceiving greater safety threats from cisgender than transgender targets—
particularly threats from cisgender men.
Table 6. Interaction between participant gender and target gender experience on threats.

F
ηp²
General
7.63**
.02
Values
3.64
.01
Coordination 6.20*
.02
Trust
7.62**
.02
Health
7.63**
.02
Freedom
4.99*
.01
Inability
1.64
.004
Safety
4.42*
.01
Degrees freedom = 1,381
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Mean (SE)
Male Participants
Female Participants
Transgender Cisgender Transgender Cisgender
3.83 (0.28) 2.64 (0.26) 2.80 (0.20) 2.92 (0.19)
4.09 (0.30) 2.67 (0.28) 3.46 (0.22) 3.01 (0.20)
3.69 (0.27) 2.63 (0.24) 2.70 (0.19) 2.76 (0.18)
3.66 (0.27) 2.47 (0.24) 2.59 (0.19) 2.63 (0.18)
3.17 (0.24) 2.50 (0.22) 2.12 (0.17) 2.55 (0.16)
3.35 (0.27) 2.48 (0.25) 2.55 (0.19) 2.70 (0.18)
3.25 (0.26) 2.71 (0.24) 2.77 (0.18) 2.79 (0.18)
2.77 (0.25) 2.38 (0.23) 2.17 (0.18) 2.67 (0.17)

Hypothesis 1b. In Hypothesis 1b, I predicted that transgender women would be perceived
to pose greater physical safety and values threats than all other groups. I tested this using a OneWay Analysis of Variance with an orthogonal contrast. The target group was the independent
variable with six levels (cis women, cis men, bisexual, trans women, trans men, nonbinary), and

19
safety and values were the dependent variables. The contrast (-1, -1, -1, 5, -1, -1) tested whether
transgender women received higher ratings than all other groups. The contrast was not
significant for safety, t(387) = 1.15, p = .25 (cis women, M = 2.07, SD = 1.89; cis men, M = 3.53,
SD = 2.40; bisexual, M = 2.16, SD = 1.80; trans women, M = 2.74, SD = 2.34; trans men, M =
2.28, SD = 1.75; nonbinary, M = 2.05, SD = 1.53). However, the contrast was marginally
significant for values, t(387) = 1.79, p = .07. Transgender women tended to pose greater values
threats (M = 3.77, SD = 2.73) than other groups (cis women, M =2.70, SD = 2.01; cis men, M =
2.98, SD = 1.91; bisexual, M =3.03, SD =2.39; trans men, M = 4.09, SD = 2.91; nonbinary, M
=3.10, SD = 2.20)
Hypothesis 1c. In Hypothesis 1c, I predicted that nonbinary people would be perceived to
pose greater social coordination threats than all other groups. I tested this in the same manner as
Hypothesis 1b, with coordination as the dependent variable. The contrast (-1, -1, -1, -1, -1, 5)
tested whether nonbinary people received higher ratings than all other groups. This contrast was
not significant, t(387) = -.52, p = .61 (cis women, M = 2.41, SD = 1.98; cis men, M = 3.27, SD =
2.17; bisexual, M = 2.52, SD = 1.99; trans women, M = 3.15, SD = 2.33; trans men, M = 3.16, SD
= 2.24; nonbinary, M = 2.75, SD = 2.00).
Hypothesis 2: Emotions
In Hypothesis 2, I predicted that transgender groups would evoke greater negativity,
disgust, anger, fear, and pity than cisgender groups. I tested this hypothesis with one 2(target
gender experience) x 3(target gender identity) x 2(participant gender) Analyses of Variance for
each emotion dependent variable. A main effect of target gender experience indicates support for
this hypothesis.
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I found support for Hypothesis 2 with four of the five emotional reactions (see Table 7):
negativity, disgust, fear, and pity. Transgender targets evoked greater levels of these emotions
than cisgender targets. I did not find support for Hypothesis 2 for anger, as transgender and
cisgender targets evoked similar levels of anger.
Table 7. Main effects of target gender experience on emotions.

F
ηp²
Negativity 18.65*** .05
Disgust
21.03*** .05
Anger
2.62
.01
Pity
38.94*** .09
Fear
8.79**
.02
Degrees freedom = 1,381
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Mean (SE)
Transgender Cisgender
3.88 (0.14) 3.04 (0.13)
3.29 (0.17) 2.24 (0.16)
2.38 (0.13) 2.09 (0.12)
3.74 (0.16) 2.37 (0.15)
2.63 (0.14) 2.09 (0.12)

Hypothesis 2a. In Hypothesis 2a, I predicted that male participants would exhibit greater
levels of negative emotions toward transgender groups than female participants. I tested this with
the same ANOVAs as above, with an interaction between participant gender and target gender
experience indicating support for this hypothesis.
I found support for Hypothesis 2a only for fear: male participants reported greater fear for
transgender targets than did female participants, but participants reported similar levels of fear
for cisgender targets. I did not find support for Hypothesis 2a for negativity, disgust, anger, or
pity (see Table 8). Male and female participants reported similar levels of these emotions for
transgender targets and for cisgender targets.
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Table 8. Interaction between participant gender and target gender experience on emotions.

F
ηp²
Negativity 0.72
.002
Disgust
3.00
.01
Anger
2.48
.01
Pity
0.64
.002
Fear
7.34** .02
Degrees freedom = 1,381
*p < .05, **p < .01

Mean (SE)
Male Participants
Female Participants
Transgender Cisgender
Transgender Cisgender
4.12 (0.23) 3.12 (0.21) 3.63 (0.17) 3.96 (0.16)
3.60 (0.27) 2.16 (0.25) 2.98 (0.19) 2.33 (0.18)
2.67 (0.22) 2.09 (0.20) 2.10 (0.15) 2.09 (0.15)
3.91 (0.26) 2.37 (0.24) 3.56 (0.19) 2.37 (0.18)
2.99 (0.22) 1.95 (0.20) 2.28 (0.16) 2.24 (0.15)

Hypothesis 2b. In Hypothesis 2b, I predicted that transgender women would evoke
greater disgust and fear than all other groups. I tested this as in Hypothesis 1b, with disgust and
fear as the dependent variables. The contrast (-1, -1, -1, 5, -1, -1) tested whether transgender
women received higher ratings than all other groups. The contrasts were significant for both
disgust, t(387) = 2.62, p = .01, and fear, t(387) = 2.02, p = .04. Transgender women evoked
greater disgust (M = 3.37, SD = 2.60) and fear (M = 2.74, SD = 1.98) than other groups (Disgust:
cis women, M = 1.88, SD = 1.54; cis men, M = 2.47, SD = 1.93; bisexual, M = 2.46, SD = 1.94;
trans men, M = 3.54, SD = 2.73; nonbinary, M = 2.60, SD = 1.91; Fear: cis women, M = 1.85, SD
= 1.31; cis men, M = 2.79, SD = 2.07; bisexual, M = 1.82, SD = 1.51; trans men, M = 2.61, SD =
1.94; nonbinary, M = 2.19, SD = 1.49).
Hypothesis 2c. In Hypothesis 2c, I predicted that nonbinary people would evoke greater
anger than all other groups. I tested this as in Hypothesis 1c, with anger as the dependent
variable. The contrast (-1, -1, -1, -1, -1, 5) tested whether nonbinary people received higher
ratings than all other groups. The contrast was not significant, t(387) = -.45, p = .65 (cis women,
M = 1.79, SD = 1.44; cis men, M = 2.72, SD = 2.08; bisexual, M = 1.82, SD = 1.55; trans women,
M = 2.35, SD = 1.83; trans men, M = 2.38, SD = 1.70; nonbinary, M = 2.11, SD = 1.48).
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Hypothesis 3
In Hypothesis 3, I predicted that threat perceptions would mediate the relationship
between target gender experience and emotion. I also predicted that target gender identity would
moderate the influence of target gender experience. Given that I did not find support for my
hypotheses regarding differences in threat perceptions based on target gender identity, I omit
gender identity as a moderator, testing only the mediation. This also allows for testing multiple
threats as mediators within the same model when they are linked to the same emotion.
Specifically, given that coordination, freedom, and trust threats are all linked to anger, I tested
them as parallel mediators between target gender experience and anger. Given that health and
values threats are both linked to disgust, I tested them as parallel mediators between target
gender experience and disgust. As inability is the only threat linked to pity, and safety is the only
threat linked to fear, I tested these with only single mediators.
I calculated the indirect effect of target gender experience on emotional reactions through
threat perceptions using Hayes (2017) PROCESS macro for SPSS (Model 4). This method uses
bootstrapping which can detect effects in small samples while maintaining control over the Type
I error rate (MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002; Williams & MacKinnon,
2008). I generated 5000 samples from the original data set using sampling with replacement.
Target gender experience was coded so that -1 = cisgender target and 1 = transgender target.
When the confidence intervals for the indirect effect do not include zero, I conclude that the
indirect effect of target gender experience on emotion through threat perception was reliable.
I did not find evidence of mediation for pity, fear, or anger (see Figures 2-4). However, I
did find evidence of partial mediation for disgust, specifically through values threat (see Figure
5). Transgender targets evoked greater values threats than cisgender targets, and values threats
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predicted disgust. This mediation partially accounted for the relationship between target gender
experience and disgust.

Figure 2. Inability threat does not mediate the association between target gender experience and
pity.
***p < .001

Figure 3. Safety threat does not mediate the association between target gender experience and
fear.
**p < .01, ***p < .001
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Figure 4. Coordination, freedom, and trust threats do not mediate the association between target
gender experience and anger.
***p < .001

Figure 5. Values, but not health, threats mediate the association between target gender
experience and disgust.
**p < .01, ***p < .001
Discussion
In this study, I sought to uncover the differences in threat perceptions and emotional
reactions to transgender and cisgender targets, and investigate potential differences in
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perceptions among transgender subgroups. Until now, transphobia has only been investigated in
broad strokes, with little uncovered about its components. Answering these questions can
uncover a more precise understanding about the predecessors of transphobic discrimination, and
how this discrimination may differ for various members of the transgender community.
Ultimately, the current findings support the notion that transgender targets pose different threats
and evoke different levels of emotion than cisgender targets, in line with the sociofunctional
threat approach (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). However, they do not support the predictions that
these threats and emotions differ by transgender subgroup, or that threats specifically predict
emotional reactions.
Considering overall differences in ratings between transgender and cisgender targets, my
hypotheses were mostly supported. For threat perceptions (Hypothesis 1), transgender targets
evoked greater perceptions of general threat, values threat, coordination threat, and trust threat
than cisgender targets, but evoked equivalent perceptions of health, freedom, inability, and safety
threats. I suspect that these differences are due to how personal and immediate these threats from
transgender targets are perceived to be. The former may be seen as more general and applying to
society as a whole: for example, the belief that transgender people “hold values that are morally
inferior to the values of people like me” (value threat) does not necessarily pose an immediate
threat to an individual, but instead threatens the moral standing of a community. In comparison,
the latter group of threats may invite more consideration of specific actions that would confirm
these threats. For example, in order to endorse that transgender people “restrict the personal
rights of people like me” (freedom threat), participants may have tried to think of an instance
when a transgender person actually restricted their personal rights. Given that only 16% of
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American adults report knowing a transgender person (GLAAD, 2015), participants were likely
not able to conjure these specific slights.
For emotional reactions (Hypothesis 2), transgender targets evoked more negativity,
disgust, fear, and pity than cisgender targets, but equivalent levels of anger. Pity showed the
strongest difference with a medium effect size, which replicates Gazzola and Morrison’s (2014)
findings for elevated pity for transgender men and women and confirms expected similarities to
sexual minorities for disgust (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). The lack of difference in anger is
surprising, given elevated rates of violence against transgender targets (Grant et al., 2011).
However, violence in general is a rare occurrence. It is possible that transgender targets evoke
anger only in a small subset of people, and that these people are the ones carrying out
transphobic violence. Given existing research on the individual differences that predict
transphobia, I would expect these people to be cis men who are high in sexism (Nagoshi et al.,
2008; Tebbe & Moradi, 2012), authoritarianism, religious fundamentalism (Nagoshi et al., 2008;
Norton & Herek, 2013), aggression proneness (Nagoshi et al., 2008), and anti-egalitarianism
(Norton & Herek, 2013). Future research will be needed to determine if these predictors of
transphobia also specifically predict anger and violence against transgender people.
Differences in male and female participants’ ratings of transgender targets (Hypotheses
1a and 2a) were more notable for threats (in which male participants reported higher general
threat, health threat, coordination threat, freedom threat, and trust threat for transgender targets)
than for emotions (in which male participants were only higher on fear). This suggests that
previous findings of elevated transphobia in men (Nagoshi et al., 2008; Tebbe & Moradi, 2012)
may be due more to men’s ideas about transgender people rather than their emotions about them.
If this is the case, it may complicate prejudice reductions strategies. Work on intergroup contact
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effects (Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005) shows that contact yields greater prejudice-reduction for
affective rather than cognitive measures of prejudice. Cognitive aspects of prejudice, such as
perceiving threats from transgender people, can be resistant to generalizations from positive
contact. Thus, contact may not be a useful a solution in reducing men’s elevated levels of
transphobia, and strategies based on myth acceptance may be needed (e.g., Case & Stewart,
2013; see “Potential Interventions” below).
My predictions regarding differences between transgender groups were less consistently
supported. By contrasts, transgender women evoked greater values threats, fear, and disgust than
other groups, which conformed to my predictions based on elevated rates of transphobic
discrimination for trans women (Grant et al., 2011). However, by means, transgender women
were not the highest rated group for any of these threats. Transgender men were slightly higher
than transgender women for values threat and disgust. It is possible that participants perceived
that transgender people of their own assigned sex were a greater threat to their own values. This
is similar to the “black sheep effect,” wherein ingroup members are judged more harshly for
transgressions than outgroup members (for review, see Marques & Paez, 1994). In this case, the
greater proportion of cis women participants could have led to trans men evoking greater values
threat and disgust overall.
For fear, cisgender men were rated slightly higher than transgender women. This likely
relates to the results for safety threat, in which transgender women did not emerge as higher than
other groups because cisgender men outstripped them. This makes sense when considering that
each participant was rating potential threats about their own group. Cis women are made
constantly aware of the threat to safety cis men pose (see Stanko, 1995), whereas cis men likely
perceive other cis men to be the only ones capable of being a safety threat to them (e.g., Kret,
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Pichon, Grezes, & Gelder, 2011). Perhaps cisgender people perceive trans women as being a
greater threat to safety than they actually are (trans women were second highest in mean ratings),
but not a greater threat than cis men.
Furthermore, neither of my predictions for nonbinary people (elevated coordination threat
and anger) bore out. For both threats, nonbinary people were only rated higher than cisgender
women and bisexual people. I suspect that participants were less familiar with the idea of
nonbinary people than of binary transgender people, and may have imagined that nonbinary
people continue to live as their assigned sex regardless of their identities or are indifferent to the
way others gender them. Both of these interpretations would be less likely to pose a coordination
threat or elicit anger. As for why cis men were elevated, I suspect that they may merely be seen
as agentic targets, and therefore more capable of interfering in various ways that could evoke
anger.
Thus, I found little evidence of differences between transgender subgroups. At least in
the abstract, cisgender participants view transgender men, transgender women, and nonbinary
people similarly. This may be due to perceptions of outgroup homogeneity, or the idea that
outgroups members are more similar to one another than ingroup members are (Judd, Ryan, &
Park, 1991). Perceived outgroup homogeneity seems likely given the already strong relationship
between homophobia and transphobia (e.g., Nagoshi et al., 2008; Tebbe & Moradi, 2012), which
reference even more distinct groups. In future work, I will use other methods that highlight the
differences between transgender subgroups insofar as these differences may lead to unique
reactions and treatment.
Overall, both cisgender men and women experienced greater negative emotional
reactions to transgender than cisgender targets, but men were more likely than women to
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experience elevated threat perceptions of transgender people. Moreover, differences between
transgender groups were not always consistent across the threat and emotion thought to be
associated with one another. This divergence played out in a general failure for threats to mediate
the relationship between target gender experience and emotional reaction. Similarly, transgender
targets did not evoke more inability threat than cisgender targets, but pity showed the largest
difference between transgender and cisgender targets. Therefore, although threats and emotions
are related, they are far from inseparable within this sample.
One possible explanation for the relationship between threat and emotion is that threat
perceptions may function in other ways to support prejudice. Pereira, Vala, and CostaLopes (2010) showed that threat perceptions mediated the relationship between prejudice and
policy-based discrimination by providing a way to legitimize discriminatory policies. Thus,
threats may in some cases be a post-hoc justification for expressing emotions, and not everyone
who experiences negative emotions may require threats to justify them. Reaching to broader
models of attitude formation, the sociofunctional threat approach works with similar assumptions
to Ajzen and Fishbein’s (1972) theory of reasoned action, in which cognitive beliefs (in this case,
threats) lead to attitudes (or emotional reactions). However, other approaches (e.g., Haidt, 2001)
posit that beliefs about the target in these models are merely justifications for affective reactions
that arise without clearly reasoned causes, and Lazarus also noted that the relationship between
cognition and emotion is bidirectional. If the threats measured here are merely justification for
negative emotional reactions, this leaves open the actual cause of these reactions. Future studies
will need to reach a fuller understanding of the complex relationship between beliefs, threat
perceptions, emotional reactions, and general attitudes in making up transphobia.
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Potential Interventions
The relationship between negative beliefs about and negative reactions to transgender
people has potentially important implications for intervening in transphobia. A handful of studies
have provided the groundwork to determine which interventions are effective in reducing
transphobia. Walch and colleagues (2012) found that a transgender speaker panel was more
effective in reducing transphobia than a traditional lecture on transphobia, suggesting the
effectiveness of intergroup contact. However, contact is not always necessary; Case and Stewart
(2013) tested three interventions (a letter from a transgender person detailing his experience, a
documentary showing a transgender person interacting with their family, and a myth-debunking
fact sheet about transgender people). These interventions were equally effective in reducing
negative attitudes and myth acceptance, but did not influence intentions to discriminate.
However, Tompkins, Shields, Hillman, and White (2015) caution about solely using information
(particularly pathologizing information) to reduce bias. When only provided information on
“gender identity disorder,” participants increased in transphobia over time, but those in the
humanizing condition (who viewed a documentary about a child with “gender identity disorder”
and engaged in perspective-taking writing) showed less transphobia and a greater willingness for
contact with transgender people. (For links between transphobia and mental illness stigma, see
Reed, Franks, & Sherr, 2015.) Brookman and Kalla (2016) offer the most definitive answer on
the necessity of contact. In a canvassing experiment that invited active perspective taking, both
transgender and cisgender canvassers were effective in inducing transphobia reduction that lasted
several months and translated into support for nondiscrimination laws.
Perspective taking works to reduce prejudice by creating overlap between the self and the
outgroup (Galinksy & Ku, 2004). Increasing links between the self an another social group via
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perspective taking may actually tackle both threats and emotions at the same time, as this
associates positive self-emotions with the target and reduces the extent to which the target is seen
as an outgroup (and, therefore, likely to pose threats to the ingroup). If threats and emotions have
an interrelated, mutually reinforcing relationship, then tackling both prongs simultaneously may
provide the best method of reducing transphobia.
Strengths, Limitations, and Future Directions
This study has several strengths that contribute to the steadily-growing literature on
transphobia. First, this is the only experiment to compare nonbinary people alongside trans men
and trans women. Doing so provides a broader perspective on multiple facets of the transgender
community. Second, this experiment uses established measures that have detected differences
between various stigmatized groups in previous studies (Cook, Cottrell, & Webster, 2015;
Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005), and these measures were highly reliable within the current sample.
Third, the sample is likely more representative of national perceptions of transgender people than
a student sample would be. I collected very little information on participants, but U.S. MTurk
workers as a whole are very similar to representative samples U.S. samples. The main notable
differences from representative samples is that they are younger, and older workers are more
liberal than their nationally-representative counterparts (Huff & Tingley, 2015). Though there is
no current data on differences in transphobia related to age, political conservatives are more
likely to endorse negative attitudes towards transgender people (Norton & Herek, 2013). This
suggests that this sample may have expressed somewhat lower levels of prejudice than a
nationally representative sample would have, but given that much previous work on transphobia
has relied on student samples (e.g., Gazzola & Morrison, 2014; Nagoshi et al., 2008; Tebbe &
Moradi, 2012; Tee & Hegarty, 2006), this sample is a step toward greater representativeness.
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When considering the results, it may seem concerning that the means only range from
around 2 to 4 on a 9-point scale. However, Cook, Cottrell, and Webster (2015) report similar
means when using these measures, with mean threat perceptions (general threat, values, and
health) ranging from 1.63 to 4.03 and emotional reaction (negativity, physical disgust, and moral
disgust) means ranging from 1.31 to 3.76 (for groups “atheists,” “students,” and a collapsed
group of “gay men,” “people with HIV,” and “Muslims”). They found the hypothesized
differences between these groups with a similar range of scores. This suggests that ratings on
these measures tend to fall in the lower half of the scale, and that low threat and emotion ratings
for groups in this study is not responsible for any failure to support my predictions.
The limitations of this study invite future work on this topic. Though I considered
providing definitions for target groups necessary, as participants have varying levels of
knowledge of the terminology used to refer to transgender people, these definitions may have
also influenced participants’ responses. First, “cisgender” was included as part of the group
labels for cisgender men and women to balance the inclusion of an adjective for all other groups
and to ensure that participants with greater awareness of transgender identities excluded their
ideas about transgender targets from their responses to cisgender targets. A cursory examination
of the definitions that participants provided after reporting their emotions and threat perceptions
revealed that some participants were confused about the definitions for cisgender targets,
misunderstanding it to be referring to transgender targets (despite the actual contents of the
definition). Thus, those who did not attend to the definitions may have been responding with
other target groups in mind. Second, I created the content of the definitions to be intentionally
neutral, so as not to prime any valence or to give primacy to target gender identity or assigned
sex. However, these neutral definitions may have ameliorated existing negative perceptions of
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target groups, leading to lower perceived threats and negative emotional reactions overall.
Previous research with these measures used only group labels (Cook, Cottrell, & Webster, 2015;
Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005), presumably because they investigated categories that they could be
sure their participants were familiar with beforehand. Thus, future research is needed to
determine if neutral definitions influenced participants.
Furthermore, regardless of the participants’ actual or reported levels of prejudice, this
survey design does not capture the way that people actually encounter transgender people in their
lives. In the context of news and mass media, transgender people may be referenced by abstract
categories, but these references are unlikely to be neutral and devoid of context. They may also
be told the exact transgender identity and its definition in the context of intentionally interacting
with a transgender person. Otherwise, people may not even know the exact category, or the
definition of that category, when they encounter transgender people, but rather recognize gender
nonconformity in presentation, language use, or legal records.
This possibility of encountering transgender people through recognizing gender
nonconformity provides opportunity for differences in perceptions of transgender subgroups that
do not depend upon differences in attitudes about the abstract definition of the group.
Transgender people of different gender identities, assigned sexes, and transition histories will
likely activate different ideas about the meaning of their gender nonconformity. It is possible that
differences in discrimination towards transgender subgroups may be less a result of specific
attitudes about the groups, and more about how the groups are encountered due to their situations
in life. For example, Lombardi (2009) reported that age of transition, degree of “outness,” race,
and class were all characteristics that influenced transgender people’s experiences of
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transphobia. Future studies should consider the impact of these and other variables (such as
perceived degree of gender nonconformity) on transphobic perceptions.
In future studies, I plan to examine these potential differences through experiments that
capture these real-life situations. For example, one study has used differences between legal
records and presentation to explore transphobic discrimination in hiring (Reed, Franks, & Sherr,
2015). Other possibilities include manipulations of names, pronouns, and visual gender cues to
capture more of the diversity in this population and provide more context for decision making. I
would also like to measure social desirability and willingness to express prejudice to other
groups in order to consider the extent to which cisgender participants will attempt to avoid
expressing transphobia.
Conclusion
In exploring the differences in threat perceptions and emotional reactions between
transgender and cisgender groups, this study yielded several notable findings. First, transgender
targets evoke greater threat perceptions and, especially, more negative emotional reactions than
cisgender targets. This provides nuance to previous general findings of prejudice against
transgender people. Second, cis men and women are about equally likely to experience negative
emotional reactions to transgender targets, but men are more likely to perceive them as posing
threats. This offers an explanation for previous work that finds men exhibit more transphobia
than women, and suggests that these differences are not merely of degree, but also of type, which
may differentially impact intervention effectiveness. Third, I found little difference in
perceptions of transgender subgroups, suggesting that at the abstract level, cisgender people view
various transgender subgroups similarly, and that differences in perceptions will need to be
investigating in more concrete ways. Finally, my results showed that threats and emotions are
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separable within transphobia, and that efforts to reduce transphobia must consider the impact on
and outcomes of both cognitive and affective aspects of prejudice. These findings add to a
steadily growing literature on the composition of transphobia that will ultimately unlock new
ways to increase the safety and security of transgender people’s existence.

APPENDIX A
GROUP DEFINITIONS
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Please think about the group cisgender men. This refers to someone who was labeled male at
birth and identifies as a man.
Please think about the group transgender men. This refers to someone who was labeled female
at birth and identifies as a man.
Please think about the group cisgender women. This refers to someone who was labeled female
at birth and identifies as a woman.
Please think about the group transgender women. This refers to someone who was labeled male
at birth and identifies as a woman.
Please think about the group bisexual people. This refers to someone who experiences attraction
to multiple genders.
Please think about the group nonbinary people. This refers to someone who does not identify as
a man or a woman, regardless of what they were labeled at birth.
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